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COMMENT
NONCONSENSUAL STERILIZATION OF THE
MENTALLY RETARDED-ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS
FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a mere fiction that sterilization "does no harm . . . other
than to eliminate [an individual's] capacity to procreate. "1 The
harm of restricting reproduction lies not in the physical conse
quences of the procedure but in the danger of abusing an individu
al's basic human rights. Sterilization2 of mentally retarded persons
raises a multitude of complex legal issues. This comment will ana
lyze judicial standards within the area of nonconsensual steriliza
tion. A brief examination of various types of sterilization will create
a framework for discussion of these judicial standards. Sterilization
takes three forms: Compulsory, voluntary, and nonconsensuill.
Compulsory sterilization of certain mental defectives is accom
plished primarily through legislation. The legislation applies re
gardless of an individual's competency.3 The compulsory statutes
originated in the eugenics movement, which began in the late
nineteenth century and peaked during the 1920's. Eugenics was
based on the notion that, since human defects are hereditary, de
fective individuals must be sterilized to preserve and improve the
human race. 4 The validity of compulsory sterilization statutes was
recognized judicially in 1907. In Buck v. BellS the Supreme Court
upheld eugenic sterilization laws as a proper exercise of state police
power. Justice Holmes' infamous statement emhodies the Court's
1. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712,721,157 N.W.2d 171, 178 (1968).
2. "Sterilization" throughout this comment refers to any medical or surgical op
eration or procedure that permanently destroys an individual's ability to reproduce.
3. See notes 15 & 16 infra and accompanying text.
4. For historical and analytical discussions regarding the eugenics movement
and compulsory sterilization, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost
Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995
(1977); Kindregran, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Gener
ations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 123 (1966); Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical
and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189; Comment, Sexual Steriliza
tion: A New Rationale?, 26 ARK. L. REV. 353 (1972).
5. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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reasoning: "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."6 Since
that time, compulsory sterilization legislation has been declared
unconstitutional on procedural due process 7 and equaL protectionS
grounds. In recent years, the theoretical foundation for eugenic
sterilization has been rejected overwhelmingly by courts and com
mentators.9 The substantive question decided in Buck, however,
has not been reexamined by the Supreme Court. While compul
sory sterilization statutes still exist,10 they are subject to a strict
constitutional analysis in which a compelling state interest must be
shown. 11
Voluntary sterilization is the self-imposed choice of an individ
ual to eliminate his or her ability to bear children. While an indi
vidual's decision regarding sterilization may be based on eugen
iCS,12 more often it is one of family planning. A woman's voluntary
sterilization decision is regarded by modem society as an accepted
contraceptive technique 13 and has been granted the same constitu
tional protection as a decision to have an abortion. 14 A mentally re
tarded individual's choice of sterilization is afforded no less protec
tion. To ensure that the procedure is voluntary and not imposed
solely for the convenience of parents, guardians, or institutional su
pervisors, however, the decision must be scrutinized closely. A
voluntary decision assumes an exercise of free will, absent coercion
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 207.
See, e.g., In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
9. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F.
Supp. 451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 12 (N.J. Feb. 18,
1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en bane);
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 1026-27; Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is
Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 602-04 (1966); Neuwirth, Heisler &
Goldrich, Capacity, Competence, Consent: Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally
Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 447, 461-63 (1975); Note, Eugenic
Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631,643-44,647 (1979).
10. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-37 (1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1, -2
(1980).
11. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451,458 (M.D.N.C. 1976). For a discussion regarding the state's interest beyond eu
genics, see Comment, Sexual Sterilization-Constitutional Validity of Involuntary
Sterilization and Consent Determinative of Voluntariness, 40 Mo. L. REV. 509,
115-20 (1975); Comment, supra note 4.
12. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 53-23-102 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
8702(1) (1968). See also notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
13. See Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices & Dilem
mas, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 529,533 (1972).
14. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978). See Comment, A
Woman's Right to A Voluntary Sterilization, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 291 (1977).
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or force. ~dditionally, the individual making the decision must
have adequate information at his or her disposal as well as the
mental competence to appreciate the decision's significance. 15
Thus, a person who is mentally incompetent cannot voluntarily con
sent to a sterilization procedure. 1s
Nonconsensual sterilization occurs whenever an individual, in
capable of valid consent, is subjected to a sterilization procedure. 17
The individual's inability either to give or to withhold consent dis
tinguishes this category from that of compulsory or voluntary steril
ization. 1s The importance of the incompetency determination is
accentuated when it is understood as a prerequisite to any non
consensual sterilization. 1s The determination of incompetency, es
pecially in the case of a mentally retarded individual, must be done
on a case-by-case basis. Decisions based upon the facts particular
to each case justly reflect the reality that mental retardation is not
synonymous with incompetency.2o The mentally retarded are far
from a homogeneous group, and incompetency cannot be generally
assumed. 21 "An individual suffering from a defect may be able, in

15. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated & re
manded, on remand sub nom., Relf v. Matthews, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975),
vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is important to note that minors
are often deemed incompetent to make voluntary decisions including those regard
ing their need for medical attention or treatment. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603
(1979).
16. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated & re
manded, on remand sub nom., Relf v. Matthews, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D. D.C. 1975),
vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
17. Sterilization proceedings for both minors and adults are initiated by a third
party, usually a parent, guardian, or state officer. E.g., In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d
295, 378 N .Y.S.2d 989 (1976) (petitioner was the mother of a twenty-two-year-old fe
male); In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d 805 (1980) (petitioner was the
Department of Social Services); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980)
(en bane) (petitioner was the mother of a sixteen-year-old female).
18. See In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 13-14 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). Voluntary
sterilization requires an individual's consent. See note 14 supra and accompanying
text. On the other hand, compulsory sterilization can occur without any determina
tion of competency. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
19. See note 101 infra.
20. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 399 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, re
manded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); see Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Murdock, Civil Rights of
Mentally Retarded-Some Critical Issues, 7 FAM. L.Q. 1,3-6 (1973); Comment, Ster
ilization of Mental Defectives: Compulsion and Consent, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 174,
187 (1975).
21. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 43 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); Murdock, supra
note 20, at 3.
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spite of that defect, to knowingly and understandingly withhold or
give consent. "22
Authority for nonconsensual sterilization is derived from either
the legislatures or the courts. State legislatures most commonly
grant the authority. State statutes often empower various parties as
decisionmakers. Statutory authority either to review or to deter
mine the sterilization decision may rest with a state agency or an
administrative board. 23 Parents or guardians also may be granted
control by statute to authorize a nonconsensual sterilization. This
exercis.e often is characterized as power of substituted consent. 24
Yet, some statutes mandate judicial review and require the court to
make the final determination whether sterilization is warranted. 25
The power of courts to order nonconsensual sterilization ab
sent specific statutory authority has been the subject of jurisdic
22. Comment, supra note 17, at 187-88.
23. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-502 (1971). The category of compulsory steriliza
tion is all-inclusive. Thus, pertinent nonconsensual sterilization situations can be in
cluded within the compulsory category.
24. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8702(4)(C)&(D) (1968) (although the term
"substituted consent" is not specifically mentioned within the Vermont provision, it
is implicit from the statutory language); see, e.g., Ruby v. Massey,452 F. Supp. 361,
366, 371-72 (D. Conn. 1978). The issue of whether a decision for sterilization can be
consented to by a third party for a mentally retarded individual who is unable to
consent has received much attention. A federal court has held that consent of a rep
resentative cannot impute voluntariness to the individual actually undergoing irre
versible sterilization, Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974), va
cated & remanded, on remand sub nom. Relf v. Matthews, 403 F. Supp 1235
(D.D.C. 1975), vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The role of a parent
or guardian with respect to a sterilization decision is less clear, however. Historic
ally, parents have been afforded broad authority over their children in the area of
medical care and treatment, for example, due to the recognition that "natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their children." Parham v. J.R.,
442 V.S. 584, 602 (1979). In light of the potential conflict of interest and the nature
of the rights at stake, however, great doubt has been cast upon the effectiveness of
substituted consent by parents or guardians for the incompetent, absent review. See,
e.g., In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236-37, 608 P.2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en bane);
Murdock, supra note 20; Comment, supra note 20; Comment, Sterilization and Pa
rental Authority, 1978 B.Y. L. REV. 380. Consent that is given by a parent or
guardian on behalf of a mental incompetent can be subject to either administrative or
judicial review. E.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978) (judicial re
view to grant sterilization on mentally incompetent children of consenting parents);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-502 (1971) (petitions are reviewed by a licensed hospital steril
ization committee). The scope of review may be limited to the appropriateness of al
lowing the parent or guardian to give consent. The review, therefore, would not ex
tend to the actual decision made. The validity of such a narrow judicial review,
however, recently has been questioned. See discussion at note 98 infra.
25. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
35-37 (1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1, -2 (1980).
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tional debate. 26 Recently, several courts found sufficient authority
to entertain and act upon a petition for sterilization despite the ab
sence of specific legislation. 27 Once the question of jurisdiction is
approbatively resolved, the court's role within the judicial steriliza
tion proceeding can vary in form. Court action may consist of ei
ther reviewing the substituted consent of a parent or guardian 28 or
determining whether the sterilization procedure should be or
dered. 29 The significant difference between the two situations is
that in the latter the court is the ultimate decisionmaker.3o
26. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, rehearing denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978),
the United States Supreme Court examined whether a state judge who had granted
an ex parte order, requested by a mother for sterilization of her minor daughter, was
entitled to judicial immunity. The Court held that where no law prohibited a court of
general jurisdiction from considering a sterilization petition, the judge had the power
to act even if such action would have been legally improper. Id. at 356-57. The Su
preme Court decision was not dispositive of whether the judge's action was a proper
exercise of jurisdiction. See In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 667, 294 N.W.2d 540,
546-47 (1980); Comment, supra note 24, at 384 n.28, 385-86. A number of state court
decisions have precluded judicial action absent statutory authority. See, e.g., Hudson
v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979); In re Tulley v. Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698,
146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); Frazier v. Levi,
440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 294 N.W.2d
540 (1980).
27. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 36 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Sallmaier,
85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d
635 (1980) (en bane). When courts lacked statutory authority, jurisdiction was predi
cated upon three principal grounds: Parens patriae power; substituted judgment;
and a broad interpretation of existing general statutory law. Note, Courts-Seope of
Authority-Sterilization of Mental Ineompetents, 44 TENN. L. REV. 789,882 (1977).
The parens patriae power of the court was relied on in the cases of In re Grady, No.
A-23, slip op. at 36 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981), and In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297,
378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (1976). Sallmaier, however, has been criticized as based on
questionable authority. See Comment, supra note 24, at 384 n.31. In re Hayes, 93
Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane), based jurisdiction on the broad grant of
judicial power found within the Washington State Constitution. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d
at 639.
28. See In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 542-43 (N.H. 1980). See also notes 90-99
infra and accompanying text.
29. E.g., In re Grady, No. A-23 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d
228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane).
30. Under the parens patriae power, the court takes action appropriate with the
best interest of the incompetent. See In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 659 n.6, 294
N.W.2d 540, 543 n.6 (1980)". While such action may consist of authorizing parents or
guardians to make a substituted judgment for the incompetent, the finding of inher
ent judicial power enables a eourt to determine and order a sterilization petition. For
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held "that an appropriate court
must make the final determination whether consent to sterilization should be given
on behalf of an incompetent individual. It must be the court's judgment, and not just
the parent's good faith decision, that substitutes for the incompetent's consent." In re
Grady, No. A-23 slip op. at 19 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). See also In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc.
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In the area of nonconsensual sterilization, where courts are the
ultimate decisionmakers, they often have been "forced either to ex
ercise [their] power in a standardless vacuum or to create standards
for decisions in this delicate area without the benefit of legislative
guidance. "31 This comment seeks to clarify the judicial role by fo
cusing on the substantive standards and evidentiary standard of
proof used by the courts to ascertain when nonconsensual steriliza
tion of a mentally retarded individual is appropriate.

II.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
RETARDED INDIVIDUAL

Mentally retarded individuals share the same constitutional
protections surrounding procreation as nonretarded persons. 32 In
the area of reproduction, two fundamental rights have been recog
nized: The right to bear children and the privacy right to make
procreation decisions free from governmental intrusion.
The right to bear children was declared a fundamental one in
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 33 The United States Supreme Court deemed
procreation "one of the basic civil rights of man"34 and stated that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. "35
The establishment of the right to procreate as fundamental was
clear as to its affirmative meaning: Freedom to reproduce. With
the emergence of a population-conscious society, courts were
forced to view procreation rights in a different light. Judicial atten
tion was drawn to the issue of whether persons had a constitution
ally protected right to make private decisions 36 regarding whether
2d 295, 297-98, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 999 (1979). But see notes 95-98 infra and accom
panying text.
31. In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 665, 294 N.W.2d 540, 545 (1980). This sit
uation primarily exists when courts exercise their power in the absence of legislative
authority. The necessity for judicially formulated standards, however, may also arise
when courts are given power to act through legislation without standards and statu
tory definitions. See In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1980); In re Johnson,
45 N.C. App. 649, 653, 263 S.E.2d 805,808 (1980).
32. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1973, 1974).
33. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
34. Id. at 541.
35. Id.
36. Procreation decisions refer to voluntary decisions by individuals capable of
consent. See text accompanying note 15 supra. An incompetent individual is unable
to make a meaningful decision on whether to procreate. Such a decision is incident
to a person's right of privacy and "should not be discarded solely on the basis that
her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice." In re Grady, No. A-23,
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or not to bear children. Consequently, in Griswold v. Connecti
cut37 the right to free choice regarding procreation within the mar
ital relationship was found to be protected by the zone of privacy
created through various constitutional guarantees. 38 This protection
later was extended to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v.
Baird: 39 "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."40 Noncon
sensual sterilization constitutes a serious invasion of this privacy
right and extinguishes the protected right of procreation. 41 There
fore, the standards employed by a court to resolve a sterilization
question necessarily must reflect the constitutional limitations upon
the infringement of a mentally retarded individual's fundamental
rights.
III.

THE BEST INTEREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL

AS THE BASIS FOR NONCONSENSUAL STERILIZATION

Although fundamental rights are recognized as deserving the
utmost protection, they are not absolute. State deprivation of
fundamental rights must withstand strict scrutiny.42 This analysis
demands that interests43 served by the infringement must be suffi
ciently compelling to outweigh the constitutionally afforded protec
tion. Further, the deprivation will not be permitted if the interest
slip op. at 18 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981) (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41 355 A.2d
647,664, cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Id. at 484-85.
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. [d. at453. Further, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
found that the right to privacy encompasses decisions made both before and after
conception. This privacy protection is afforded irrespective of age and thus covers
minors. See Carey v. Population Serv's. Infl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parent
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
41. As early as 1942 the potential dangers of unrestrained sterilization were re
alized: "[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are in
imical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." 316 U.S. at 541.
42. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
43. The reasons stated by a third party, either the parents or the state, will be
considered "state interests" for the purposes of this comment. Parents may seek ster
ilization of their mentally retarded children for reasons other than the child's well
being. They may wish to avoid the economic and social costs of caring for grandchil
dren, or the possible social stigma, or they simply may seek peace of mind. See note
24 supra. Parents may also assert the state interests that follow in text.
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can be achieved by less drastic means. 44 When an individual is
unable to consent to sterilization, two intere.sts may be advanced to
override his or her right to procreate. The asserted justifications
may be the state's interest either in the health and welfare of po
tential offspring or in the best interest of the individual. 45

A.

Health and Welfare of Potential Offspring
Regard for possible progeny focuses on the harm resulting
from a defective genetic heritage and an inadequate family environ
ment. 46 The concern surrounding inheritable deficiencies rarely is
justified and therefore is suspect. In most instances, children born
to mentally retarded individuals will not have genetic defects. 47
When an individual is suffering from mental retardation due to an
identifiable genetic mechanism, it is likely that the individual also
may be sterile. 48 This professed societal interest in benefiting the
unborn child unmistakably smacks of eugenics, that is, purity of
the human race, and is equally unacceptable.
Society's concern that environmental factors may have a
damaging impact on the possible offspring of mentally retarded
persons has scientific support. A recent theory asserts the proposi
tion that "a child who was normal when born could be seriously re
tarded by the inadequate environment provided by his mentally
defective parents. "49 The environmental theory of retardation is
valid only if buttressed. by specific facts and circumstances sur
rounding a particular sterilization decision. Otherwise, many re
tarded persons who possess the capability of being or becoming
good parents50 unjustifiably would be denied the opportunity to
raise a family. Additionally, sterilizations based on a broad applica
tion of the environmental theory ultimately may serve a public in
44. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
45. See, e.g., id.; In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 102-03, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976);
In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en bane).
46. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420
F. Supp. 451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
47. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 235-36, 608 P.2d 635, 639-40 (1980) (en
bane). See also note 9 supra.
48. As of 1961, for example, only seven cases of Down's Syndrome women with
children had been reported, and there are no reported cases involving a Down's Syn
drome father. Forssman, Lehmann & Thysell, Reprcorluction in Mongolism, 65 AM. J.
MENT. DEFIC. 495, 495 (1961).
49. Comment, supra note 4, at 357. Contra, Note, Retarded Parents in Neglect
Proceedings: The Erroneous Assumption of Parental Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REV.
785,801 (1979).
50. See note 60 infra.
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terest associated not with the health of the child but with the bur
den that the child may impose on society. 51 When an incompetent
parent is unable to supply adequate child care, state intervention
in order to protect the child may be necessary. Removal of chil
dren from inadequate homes or publicly assisted family support
services inevitably would create a financial burden on the state. 52
A fundamental right, however, should not be deprived on the basis
of the increased costs that its exercise may cause. 53

B.

In the Best Interest of the Individual

Nonconsensual sterilization also may be justified when it is in
the best interest of the individual. 54 The fundamental right to pro
create should not be violated unless contraception is shown to be
necessary to the individual's well-being. Sterilization can fulfill this
contraceptive need; but, due to the drastic nature of this irreversi
ble procedure and its long lasting and possibly detrimental emo
tional effects,55 it remains an extreme method of birth control.
To ensure that the person's fundamental right to private
choice is not abridged unnecessarily, the court must be sure that
the individual does not have the potential to make his or her own
decision concerning sterilization. Age and educability of the men
tally deficient are key indicators of this potential. 56 In the case of a
minor incompetent, special attention should be paid to whether
the individual might possibly develop the facilities necessary to
make an informed decision. 57 Unless the incompetency is perma
nent, judicial intervention is not warranted.

51. See, e.g., In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 103,221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976).
52. See Comment, supra note 4, at 357.
53. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (equal protection
case). Note that even when strict judicial scrutiny is not the required test for
evaluating a state asserted interest, administrative costs alone are not a sufficient rea
son to deprive an individual of constitutionally protected rights. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
54. In re Grady, A-23, slip op. at 40 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); North Carolina Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 454-55 (M.D.N.C. 1976);
In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en bane).
55. See Kindregan, supra note 4, at 139-40.
56. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en bane). As
many as 25% of the residents of institutions for the mentally retarded may be suffer
ing from correctible emotional or physical disabilities. Bayles, Sterilization of the
Retarded: In Whose Interest?, The Legal Precedents, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37,
41 (1978).
57. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 42 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Hayes, 93
Wash. 2d 228, 239, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en bane).
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Factors that most readily indicate a need for sterilization in
clude: Danger to health, inability to parent, and absence of a less
restrictive alternative. 58 When procreation would endanger the life
or severely impair the health of the mentally retarded person, ster
ilization may be required for medical reasons. Such situations stand
apart from ,the instant issue of providing steri,lization as a non
therapeutic contraceptive technique.
Consideration of a mentally retarded person's ability to parent
entails examination, from the individual's perspective, of his or her
capability to shoulder the burdens of child rearing. 59 Mental retar
dation does not in itself suggest parental inadequacy.60 Empirical
research has revealed that mentally retarded parents can provide
the skills traditionally associated with adequate parenting. Those
skills include bestowing love and affection, performing housekeep
ing tasks, meeting a child's physical needs, and providing intellec
tual stimulation. 61 It is important to note that the court would not
have to find that the parenting skills exceed the level of ade
quacy.62 The court's inquiry should not be whether a parent is su
perior to all others but whether the parent can satisfactorily pro
vide care to a child. 63 Some mentally retarded persons who are
able to function and meet their own needs may be unable to sus
tain the burden of family responsibilities. 64 Evidence that any chil
dren born to the retarded individual probably will suffer from a
purely genetic or an environmentally caused defect 65 woul~ surely
be a factor in determining a person's capacity to meet the demands
of parenthood.
Permanent mental incompetence also has raised serious doubts
about parental ability. This belief primarily rests on two grounds.
The first is that a correlation exists between inability to consent to
a sterilization and capability to parent. 66

58. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en bane),
59, See In re Grady, No, A-23, slip op. at 36 (N,J. Feb, 18, 1981).
60. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236-37, 608 P,2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en
bane); Mickelson, Can Mentally Deficient Parents be Helped to Give Their Children
Better Care?, 61 AM. J, MENT. DEFIC, 516, 532 (1949).
61. Note, supra note 49, at 797,
62. See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra,
63. Cf. Note, supra note 49, at 797 (neglect proceedings).
64. See In re Moore, 289 N.c' 95, 104, 221 S,E.2d 307, 313 (1976); In re
Johnson, 45 N,C, App, 649, 653-54, 263 S,E.2d 805, 809 (1980).
65. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
66, Bayles, supra note 56, at 40-41.
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A person who cannot comprehend the consequences of, and
alternatives to, sterilization often lacks the basic capacity to -un
derstand long-range interests. A parent must consider and make
judgments concerning a child's medical welfare. If a person is in
capable of making such judgments for herself, then she is surely
incapable of making them for others. 67

Second, if an individual is unable to provide for self-needs, she or
he likewise will be incapable of caring for the needs of a child. 68
Generally, these assumptions are well founded; broad acceptance,
however, leaves room for abuse. Creating a per se category of
parental incompetents eases the burden of those resolving the ster
ilization issue. This directly conflicts with the desire to protect indi
viduals from unwarranted sterilizations. Application of these assump
tions within the context of each individual case offers safeguards to
the incompetent.
Factors demonstrating the need for sterilization must be con
sistent with the constitutional doctrine of least restrictive alterna
tives. 69 That is, intrusion by the state must have minimal impact
upon an individual's fundamental rights. This doctrine primarily
demands that the contraceptive measure approved by the court en
tails the least physical invasion to the body. Less drastic forms of
birth control such as IUD's, antifertility drugs, or sex education
must be considered infeasible before an individual is irreversibly
deprived of his or her capacity to procreate.
In the context of parenting, the least restrictive alternatives
doctrine mandates an inquiry into whether an individual incapable
of providing adequate care alone would be able to parent compe
tently with assistance. 7o Parental assistance may take the form of
practical training focusing on child health care and child rearing
skills. Alternatively, support and supervision by others may be
provided to increase the individual's ability to parent.71 Steriliza
67. Id. at 41.
Id.
See text accompanying note 44 supra.
- 70. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 238, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en bane).
71. For example, support may be provided by a competent spouse, see In re
Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 44 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981), or by community social or health
care services. The requirement of a provision that mandates examination of the effect
that support services and training may have on an individual's ability to parent raises
several important issues beyond the s~ope of this comment including: What
standards should govern the decision of whether assistance in any given situation is
feasible; what qualifications determine whether a mentally retarded individual re
68.
69.
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tion cannot be authorized if the ability to parent can be realized
with outside assistance or if less drastic forms of contraception are
available.

Inappropriateness of State Interest in Potential Life
as Basis for Nonconsensual Sterilization
Although the state interest in potential life 72 may legitimately
justify the deprivation of the right to procreate, it should not be
used in the nonconsensual sterilization setting. 73 Three factors exist
which lend support to this conclusion: 1lle right to privacy sur
rounding procreation decisions; the incorporation of the potential
life interest within the best interest of the individual; and the doc
trine of least' restrictive alternatives.
Judicial qeterminations within the nonconsensual ,ste,riHzation '
category are mad~ when persons are unable to exerCise their ,right
to make private decisions' regarding procreation. The necessity' of
judicial' intervention, does ,not dimiilisha person: s constitutional
right to reproductive autonomy.74 1llus, a court's judgment should"
be "consistent with the relative weights of the respective' interests' "
. Ive d.... "75
mvo
Court-ordered sterilization may be supported by two interests
that arise from the state's concern with the impact of the steriliza
tion decision upon society and upon the individual. Society's inter
est lies in preventing the birth of genetically defective children and
in avoiding the burdens that neglected children place upon the
community at large. 76 Concern for the individual similarly involves
a consideration of potential life. A decision that sterilization is in
the best interests of an individual necessarily includes an examina
tion of the person's ability to parent. As previously discussed,77 the
consequences of bearing a defective child are intrinsic to this analy
sis.
Although both justifications share a concern for potential life, a
, determination founded on the best interest of the individual signifi
C.

ceives assistance, Le., extent of handicap; and what quality and quantity of services
must be provided.

72. See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra.
73. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 37 n.8, 37-38 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981).
74. ld. at 36.
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court
struck a balance between the state interest in potential life and a woman's right to
privacy concerning an abortion decision.
76. See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra.

1981]

NONCONSENSUAL STERlLZATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED

701

cantly differs from one that embraces society's interest. A decision
that reflects the best interests of an individual is "designed to fur
ther the same interests she might pursue had she the ability to de
cide herself'78 and thereby affords maximum protection to an in
competent's privacy right to make reproduction choices. On the
other hand, a decision from the perspective of society inherently
conflicts with the privacy notion that procreation decisions are to
be free from governmental intrusion. Thus, judicial intervention
based exclusively on the best interest of the individual incorporates
a concern for potential life and ensures that an incompetent's pri
vacy rights are amply protected.
Consideration of an independent societal interest in potential
life also would undercut the protection provided by the least re
strictive alternatives doctrine. A clear example of this exists within
North Carolina. Under that state's statutory scheme,79 a district
court judge can order a nonconsensual sterilization when a men
tally retarded individual "would probably be unable to care for a
child or children."8o The statute's purpose was clear: To prevent
the birth of a child who cannot be cared for by his or her par
ent(s).81 The legislature, however, was not clear in defining what
conditions would demonstrate an inability to provide proper care.
The North, Carolina Court of Appeals, in In re johnson,82 at
tempted to clarify the standard. The court instructed the trial
judges to determine an individual's parental ability by appraising
whether a minimum standard of care could be established. 83 A per
son's ability to provide minimum care would be shown when it was
probable that a "reasonable do~estic environment for the child"
would be maintained. 84
.The court's definition stressed the need to balance both the in
dividual's fundamental rights and the concerns of the state. It is in
In re Grady, No, A-23, slip op. at 36 (N.}. Feb. 1B, 19B1).
79. While this comment's focus is upon judicial action absent legislative guid
ance, an examination of North Carolina's statutory scheme, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43
(1976), provides insight into the conflict between the least restrictive alternative doc
trine and consideration of society's concern for potential life.
BO. Id. The statute additionally provides for sterilization when procreation
would likely lead to the birth of a defective child. Id.
B1. In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 653, 263 S.E.2d B05, BOB (19BO). The soci
etal concern underlying the statute is twofold: the state is interested in both the best
interest of the individual and the burden that uncared for children impose on soci
ety. In re Moore, 2B9 N.C. 95, 103-04, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (1976).
B2. 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d B05 (19BO).
83. Id. at 653, 263 S.E.2d at B09.
84. Id.
7B.
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adequate because it stems from the belief that the state has a sepa
rate and valid societal interest in preventing the birth of children
who will be a burden on the state. 85 The definition fails to provide
sufficient protection for mentally retarded individuals because it
does not include a least restrictive alternatives test. Johnson directs
the district judge to inquire whether a reasonable family environ
ment would exist. There is no requirement, however, that the
judge consider whether the parent's ability to care for a child
would be adequate if assistance were provided. Thus, while mini
mal protection is afforded, the mentally retarded persons subject to
North Carolina law do not receive protection commensurate with
the nature of their fundamental rights.
In order to provide the utmost protection to individuals who
face the possibility ()f nonconsensual sterilization, the court should
make its decision solely on the basis of the best interest of the indi
vidual. A nonconsensual sterilization determination predicated
upon the person's best interest preserves the individual's right to
make private reproduction decisions, maximizes constitutional safe
guards by assimilating the use of the least restrictive alternatives
doctrine, and satisfactorily takes into account the only legitimate
societal interest: The health of possible offspring.

IV.

STANDARDS GOVERNING

A

NONCONSENSUAL

STERILIZATION DETERMINATION

To ensure that the personal rights implicated in nonconsensual
sterilization decisions are given proper consideration, guidelines
must be promulgated that incorporate constitutional restraints and
set· forth permissible grounds for· authorizing the procedure. The
contents of substantive standards are far from consistent among the
courts. Several have attempted to fashion a framework in which
nonconsensual sterilization may be ordered. While similar proce
dural safeguards have been prescribed,86 formulation of substantive

85. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. North Carolina statutes allow
petitions for sterilization of mental defectives when in the best interest of the men
tal, moral, or physical improvement of the individual or for the public good. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 35-37 (1976).
86. Procedural due process requires that the incompetent be represented by
counsel throughout the sterilization proceeding. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, rehearing denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383
(M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1980); In re Grady, No.
A-23, slip op. at 41 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 295-98, 378
N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (1976); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 238, 608 P.2d 635, 640
(1980) (en bane). See also text accompanying notes 102 & 112 infra.
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requirements have been far from uniform and, in some instances,
inadequate.
An extreme example of inadequate substantive protection is
illustrated by a New York decision. In In re Sallmaier87 a New
York court authorized sterilization for a twenty-two-year-old se
verely retarded incompetent female after concluding that the pro
cedure would be in her best interest. 88 The court reached this de
cision after consulting psychiatric experts and receiving testimony
by the guardian ad litem. 89 No standards of any kind were articu
lated by the court to govern present or future nonconsensual
sterilization decisions.
A New Hampshire court's effort to create sufficient standards
yielded a result similar to that reached in New York. Under a New
Hampshire law the probate court was designated to be the proper
decisionmaker in sterilization cases. 90 The statute, however, was si
lent as to when and under what conditions a probate judge may ex
ercise his or her power. "[T]he absence of standards and statutory
definitions requires that the courts construe and apply the statutory
provisions to the evidence in each case so as to adequately protect
the respondent's fundamental rights."91 The New Hampshire Su
preme Court, in In re Penny N., 92 attempted to resolve this prob
lem by delineating a framework within which the probate judge
must determine whether sterilization approval is warranted. In
Penny, a probate judge was petitioned to authorize a fourteen-year
old girl's parents to consent to her sterilization. 93 The supreme
court held that the probate court could "permit a sterilization after
making specific written findings ... that it is in the best interest of
the incapacitated ward, rather than the parents' or the public's con
venience, to do so. "94 The specific requirements established by the
court for a judge to follow in making a sterilization decision rested
upon those developed by the New Jersey trial court in In re
Grady.95 Specifically, a judge must be satisfied "that the applicants
have demonstrated their~ good faith and that their concern is for the
best interests of the ward. "96
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976).
Id. at 297-98,378 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
Id.
.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25, I(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 652, 263 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1980).
414 A.2d 541 (N.H. 1980).
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (1979).
414 A.2d at 543. In addition, the court required that:
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The New Hampshire court's reliance on Grady stemmed pri
marily from the factual similarities between the two cases. 97 This
dependence on Grady's reasoning resulted in the adoption of
standards that conflict with the New Hampshire statute's purpose.
The guidelines articulated in Grady assess the appropriateness of
parents as decisionmakers.98 The New Hampshire law provides:
"no guardian may give consent for ... sterilization ... unless the
procedure is first approved by order of the probate court. "99 Al
though this statute directed the probate court to make an inde
pendent assessment, the guidelines accepted by the supreme court
in Penny did not indicate when sterilization would be in the best
interest of the individual. Instead, the standards only seek to as

[the court) must first appoint an independent guardian ad litem to act as
counsel for the "incapacitated" ward, with full opportunity to present proofs
and cross-examine witnesses. At a hearing, medical testimony and all other
relevant testimony and records must be presented to the court. The court
must be satisfied that the ward is "incapacitated" within the meaning of
RSA 464-A:2, XI ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
97. In both cases parents brought sterilization petitions for their minor daugh
ters who suffered from Down's Syndrome. 414 A.2d at 542; 170 N.J. Super. at 101,
405 A.2d at 852.
98. In In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (1979), the court under its
parens patriae power examined the appropriateness of the paI:ents' substituted
consent for the sterilization of their minor daughter. This determination rested upon
court-created standards of review. Id. at 125-27, 405 A.2d at 865. The Grady court's
main inquiry hinged on whether the interests of the parents were congruent with
those of the chil~, that is, whether the parents were acting in the child's best
interest:
[ilt is not for this court to substitute its judgment for the informed consent of
Lee Ann Grady nor, as has been suggested, to weigh the relative advantages
and risks of other methods of contraception. It is, instead, appropriate under
these circumstances, having set forth an-d followed all appropriate proce
dural safeguards, to authorize and emp~wer her parents as general guardians
to decide as they deem she would were she capable of informed judgment.
This may include, in their sound discretion, the exercise of their substituted
consent to any method of temporary or permanent contraception ....
Id. at 126-27, 405 A.2d at 865-66. See also Note, Sterilization, 18 J. FAM. L. 648
(1980).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has subsequently vacated that part of the trial
court's holding that gave parents or guardians full discretion with regard to consent
decisions. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 9 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). This recent rever
sal rested on the belief that the substance of consent for sterilization must come from
the court, not from the parents: "[i)ndependent judicial decisionmaking is the best
way to protect the rights and interests of the incompetent and to avoid abuses of the
decision to sterilize." Id. at 21.
99. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25, I(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis
added).
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sur.e that the parents' or guardians' interests are not controlling.
The failure to determine what constitutes the best interest of the
incapacitated person leaves the New Hampshire probate courts
without the necessary guidelines to fulfill their statutory duty to
approve sterilization procedures.
One court, without any legislative authority or guidance, took
the initiative to develop comprehensive standards governing non
consensual sterilization proceedings. In In re Hayes 100 the Su
preme Court of Washington established an array of procedural and
substantive standards that must be met prior to any sterilization
order. 101 The decision can be made only in a proceeding that con
tains the following procedural safeguards: "(1) The incompetent in
dividual is represented by a disinterested guardian ad litem, (2) the
court has received independent advice based upon a comprehen
.. 'sive medical, psychological, and social evaluation of the individual,
arid (3) to the greatest extent possible, the court has elicited and
taken into account the view of the incompetent individual. "102
Within this framework the judge must find that the evidence
indicates a need for contraception. This need is indicated if the
court finds that the individual is:
(1) physically capable of procreation, and
(2) likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in the
near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy,
and ...
(3) the nature and extent of the individual's disability as deter
mined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of
standardized tests, renders him or her permanently incapable of
caring for a child, even with reasonable assistance. 103

Finally, there must be no alternative to sterilization. The judge
must find: "(1) All less drastic contraceptive methods, including su
pervision, education and training, have been proved unworkable or
inapplicable, and (2) the proposed method of sterilization entails

100. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane).
101. Inability to consent must he determined first. The Hayes court set the fol
lowing framework for determination of the ability to consent: "the judge must find
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the individual is (1) incapable of mak
ing his or her own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely to develop suffi
ciently to make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future."
Id. at 238,608 P.2d at 641.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
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the least invasion to the body of the individual. "104 The court fur
ther stated that the proponent must show by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that current scientific and medical knowledge
does not suggest either that a reversible sterilization procedure or
other less drastic method will be available in the near future or
that "science is on the threshold of an advance in the treatment of
the individual's disability. "105
The court concluded by emphasizing:
[t]here is a heavy presumption against sterilization of an individ
ual incapable of informed consent that must be overcome by the
person or entity requesting sterilization. This burden will be
even harder to overcome in the case of a minor incompetent,
whose youth may make it difficult or impossible to prove by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence that he or she will never
be capable of making an informed judgment about sterilization
or of caring for a child. lOS

While the standards promulgated by the court seek to protect
those most susceptible to abuse, such as minors, requiring evi
dence of scientific and medical advancements may undercut the
court's recognition that sterilization is warranted in some in
stances. 107 This speculative standard may unduly frustrate a peti
tioner's goals irrespective of the incompetent's age.
The Hayes court, however, was the nrst to confront directly
the problem of compiling substantive guidelines that sufficiently
protect the rights of noninstitutionalized mentally retarded individ
uals. The court's reliance on the best interest of the individual as
the only acceptable state interest Jed it to develop standards that
not only shield an individual from erroneous sterilization but that
also provide a framework in which the legitimate desire of a peti
tioner can be effectuated.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently followed Hayes' di
rection by ruling that it is a court's responsibility to determine an
incompetent individual's need for sterilization based solely on an
examination of his or her best interest. 10S In re Grady109 reflects
104. [d. at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641.
105. [d. at 239, 608 P.2d at 641.
106. [d.
107. [d. [I.t 242, 608 P.2d at 643 (concurring opinion).
108. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 21,39-41 (N.]. Feb. 18, 1981). This deci
sion explicitly rejected the trial court's holding that parents and guardians alone
should determine and substitute consent. [d. at 19. See also note 98 supra for a
discussion regarding the trial court decision.
109. No. A-23 (N:J. Feb. 18, 1981).
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the duty of a court to preserve an individual's privacy right to re
productive autonomyllO as well as an "overriding concern to pre
vent any abuse of judicial authority . . . . "111 Pursuant to these be
liefs, the Grady court produced rigid procedural1l2 and substantive
standards that would enable courts "to protect the human rights of
people least able to protect themselves. "113
The substantive standards developed by the court to provide
guidance in determining when sterilization is in an individual's best
interest parallel those set in Hayes. 114 Moreover, the New Jersey
Supreme Court expanded the Hayes guidelines to include three
additional factors:
The possibility that the incompetent person will experience
trauma or psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or
gives birth, and, conversely, the possibility of trauma or psycho
logical damage from the sterilization operation ....
. . . The advisability of sterilization at the time of the application
rather than in the future. While sterilization should not be post
poned until unwanted pregnancy occurs, the court should be
cautious not to authorize sterilization before it clearly has be
come an advisable procedure.
. . . A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization are
seeking it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the
best interests of the incompetent person rather than their own
or the public's convenience,l15

The major distinction among the criteria established in the two
cases rests on a consideration of the individual's ability to parent.
While both courts evinced a concern for whether an individual was
permanently incapable of caring for a child even with assistance,
they differed on the nature of proof required for such a determina
tion. The Grady court stated that a trial judge must consider "[t]he
ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the possi
110. The court stated:
[t]he right to choose among procreation, sterilization and other methods of
contraception is an important privacy right of all individuals. Our court must
preserve that right. Where an incompentent person lacks the mental capacity
to make that choice, a court should ensure the exercise of that right on be
half of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or her best interests.
Id. at 21.
111. Id. at 39.
112. The procedural safeguards and the guidelines governing the prerequisite
finding of incompetency are analogous to those set by the Hayes court. Id. at 40-42.
113. Id. at 54.
114. Compare id. at 43-44 with text accompanying notes 103-105 supra.
115. No. A-23, slip op. at 43-44.
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bility that the incompetent may at some future date be able to
marry and, with a spouse, care for a child. "116 This standard, un
like that found in Hayes, 117 did not mandate the use of empirical
evidence. Further, the Hayes court demanded a more searching
inquiry into whether a parent's ability to provide child care would
increase with "reasonable assistance. "118 This factor is substantially
broader than consideration of what support a spouse can pro
vide. 119
Despite t.his difference, the safeguards evolved by both courts
demonstrate a common regard for the protection of the rights and
interests of incompetent individuals subject to sterilization. Their
development of comprehensive substantive standards predicated on
the best interest of the individual may hail a commendable trend
toward closer examination of the constitutional rights implicated in
sterilization proceedings.
V.

PERTINENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARD OF PROOF:
EVALUATION NECESSARY

The amount of protection a fundamental right receives can
vary not only with the nature of applicable procedural and substan
tive standards but also with the requisite burden of proof. 120
Traditionally, courts have employed three levels of proof. 121 In a
civil case between private parties for monetary damages, "society
has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits,"122
so the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 123 In a
criminal case, "where one party has at stake an interest of tran
scending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty,"124 due pro
cess requires that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. 125 The intermediate standard of proof requires
116. Id. at 44.
117. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
118. Id.
119. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
120. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), in which Chief Justice
Burger stated with regard to involuntary commitment proceedings: "[i]ncreasing the
burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the deci
sion and thereby perhaps reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will
be ordered." Id. at 427.
121. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 339, at 793 (2d ed. 1972).
122. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); see In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 364.
125. Id.
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clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and has been used to pro
tect particularly important individual interests, such as reputation
or citizenship, in various civil cases .126
The appropriate standard of proof in any judicial proceeding
depends upon the seriousness of the consequences of an erroneous
judgment. 127 As the importance of the individual interest at stake
increases, a proportionately higher standard of proof is required to
reduce the risk of error. "In cases involving individual rights,
whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum]
reflects the value society places on individual liberty.' "128 The
clear and convincing standard has been applied uniformly in sterili
zation determinations, usually without comment. 129 For example,
one court, absent any analysis, rejected the preponderance of the
evidence standard as insufficient protection and the beyond a rea
sonable doubt standard as overprotective of the individual interest
at stake. 130
The courts' silent treatment of the pertinent standard of proof
may be explained in light of Addington v. Texas .131 In Addington
the Supreme Court confronted the question of what standard of
proof should be used in an involuntary commitment proceeding. 132
The Court, refusing to require the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, held that clear and convincing evidence was sufficient to
guarantee due process. 133 Since Addington involved fundamental
rights of a magnitude similar to th.ose implicated in a sterilization
decision, the courts may have believed it unnecessary to address
the proof issue. 134 A closer look at Addington precludes such a cur
126. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
127. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
note 145 infra and accompanying text.
128. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Mary
land, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971».
129. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 237, 608 P.2d at 641; In re Penny N.,
414 A.2d at 543.
.
130. 414 A.2d at 543.
131. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
132. Appellant's lengthy history of emotional difficulties began in 1969. In
1975, after an arrest for threatening to assault his mother, appellant's mother filed a
petition for his indefinite commitment. Id. at 421. At trial appellant claimed that
there was no substantial basis for a conclusion that he was probably dangerous either
to himself or to others. The jury found against appellant. On appeal, appellant ar
gued that any standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt violated his pro
cedural due process rights. Id.
133. Id. at 431.
134. See 170 N.J. Super. at 125-26 n.20, 405 A.2d at 865 n. 20. Both Addington
and the nonconsensual sterilization cases involve important individual liberty inter
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sory analysis. While the Court staunchly denied the need for the
reasonable doubt standard, it left the states free to choose between
the clear and convincing evidence and reasonable doubt stan
dards. 13s State courts, when faced with the task of creating
guidelines to govern a proceeding involVing such fundamental
rights,136 should carefully examine the Addington rationale in con
junction with a balancing of the individual and state interests. 137
In Addington the Court advanced three major distinctions be
tween civil and criminal proceedings. It used these distinctions to
reject the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in civil commit
ments. 138 The Court first recognized that the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard historically has been limited to criminal cases. 139
Allocating standards of proof according to a superficial categori
zation such as civil or criminal fails to provide the evaluation of un
derlying interests and rights that is required by due process. In
prior decisions involving the due process requirements of juvenile
proceedings, the Court explicitly rejected the civil-criminal la
bels. 140 The nature of the deprivation rather than the nature of the
proceeding determined what level of protection was afforded. 141
The Addington Court "took great pains to delineate the 'civil' as
pect of the involuntary commitment proceeding"142 in order to dis
tinguish it from a criminal case and a juvenile proceeding that has
"criminal overtones. "143 Despite this effort, the Court did not fore
close the use of a reasonable doubt standard in civil cases but
merely warned that courts "should hesitate to apply it too broadly
or casually in noncriminal cases. "144
ests. In Addington, the Court recognized that commibnent constituted a significant
deprivation of liberty as well as creating "adverse social consequences" that can
have "a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U.S. at 426. Likewise, sterili
zation deprives individuals of the fundamental right to reproduce and may intrude
upon the individual's right to privacy. See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text.
Additionally, sterilization can have "longlasting detrimental emotional effects." 93
Wash. 2d at 228, 608 P.2d at 635. See also note 55 supra. It may also pose a social
barrier to those persons who are able to and desire to have families.
135. 441 U.S. at 427.
136. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
137. Cj. In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. 1979).
138. 441 U.S. at 428-31.
139. Id. at 428.
140. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50
(1967).
141. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,50 (1967).
142. Markey v. Wachtel, 264 S.E.2d 437, 443 (W. Va. 1979).
143. Id.
144. 441 U.S. at 428.

1981]

NONCONSENSUAL STERlLZATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED

711

The second difference between civil and criminal proceedings
asserted by the Court related to the respective risk and impact of
an erroneous decision. 145 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard
has its roots in the belief that in criminal cases it is better to allow
a guilty person to go without punishment than for an innocent per
son to be deprived of his or her liberty. 146
A greater degree of caution in coming to a conclusion should be
practiced to guard life or liberty against the consequences of a
mistake always painful, and possibly irreparable, than is neces
sary in civil cases, where . . . the issue must be settled in ac
cordance with one view or the other, and the verdict is followed
with positive results to one party or the other but not of so seri
ous a nature. 147

In civil commitments, the consequences of an erroneous decision
were perceived differently. Civil confinement was viewed as a
treatment measure in which the state had a legitimate interest. 148
It was reasoned, therefore, that it was not "better for a mentally ill
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be
committed"149 because those who genuinely require treatment
would suffer the detriment of not receiving care. Further, an erro
neous confinement, while undesired, is different from a criminal
sentence in that "the layers of professional review and observation
of the patient's condition . . . and the concern of family and friends
generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous
commitment to be corrected. "150 This rationale does not apply in
sterilization situations. Sterilization is an irreversible deprivation,
the finality of which "is as predictable as the execution of one sen
tenced to capital punishment. "151 The use of substantive standards
that allow sterilization when in the person's best interest assures
that sterilization will be prescribed only when a genuine need ex
ists. Moreover, a person does not suffer from a lack of treatment if
145. Id. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 121, at § 341, at 798-99; Ball, The
Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807,
816 (1961).
146. 441 U.S. at 428.
147. Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209, 213 (1872).
148. 441 U.S. at 426.
149. Id. at 429.
150. Id. at 428-29.
151. In re Flannery, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2345 (Montgomery County Md. Cir.
Ct. 1980). "There is no redemption for the individual [sterilized] ... Any experiment
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a ba
sic liberty." 316 U.S. at 541.
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nontherapeutic sterilization is denied. To the contrary, a noncon
sensual sterilization denial leaves the individual's physical integrity
.
intact. 152
Finally, the practical problems of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt were offered by the Court as justifying the use of the lower
standard. The decisionmaker's reliance upon fallible and uncertain
psychiatric testimony raised "a serious question as to whether a
state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that an individ
ual should be committed. 153 A civil commitment proceeding in
volvesa subjective determination of the person's mental condition
and the likelihood that he or she will be dangerous in the fu
ture. l54 This determination was characterized by the Court as de
pendent upon the "subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagno
sis. "155 It was contended that the focus on the inquiry in a criminal
proceeding, unlike a civil commitment, is upon straightforward and
objective factual questions. 156 Since psychiatric testimony plays a
central role in determining the need for confined therapy, the
Court precluded the use of a standard that demands certainty. 157
Criminal cases, however, cannot accurately be described as
free from subjective inquiries. State of mind often arises as a chief
issue, especially when insanity is raised as a defense. In a criminal
case, once the insanity defense is raised the evidentiary burden
shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ac
cused was sane at the time of the alleged crime. 158 One commenta
tor has described this burden on the state as "practically impossi
ble"159 to surmount.
The distinction raised in Addington, even if taken at face
152. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
153. 441 U.S. at 429.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 430.
156. Id. at 429-30.
157. Id.
158. D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 65-67 (1980).
159. Id. at 68. The author emphasized this point by stating:
[the state] must find an "expert" willing to testify that there is (or was!)
nothing wrong with the defendant's mind that could possibly have dimin
ished his ability to confonn his behavior to the requirements of law; [and]
that the defendant labors under neither delusions nor hallucinations; that
the defendant unquestionably knew the nature and consequences of his ac
tions and judged these to be legally and morally, or least morally, right. Can
any of this ever be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?
Id. (emphasis in original). See also United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 761 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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value, does not apply with equal force to sterilization proceedings.
The testimony of psychiatrists and mental health workers is impor
tant in resolving sterilization questions, but the decisionmaker's re
liance upon such testimony is not of the same degree as it is in
commibnent hearings. The capabilities of a mentally retarded in
competent are more easily ascertained than the degrees of mental
illness. Additionally, the trier of fact will be well acquainted with
the skills and qualities required of parents 160 and will not be de
pendent on the analysis and expertise of psychiatrists. The question
of competency for consent purposes is subject to the practical proof
problems raised in Addington. Such a determination necessarily in
volves a subjective inquiry into the individual's mental state. 161
The competency question is, however, a prerequisite to the central
issue concerning whether sterilization is in the best interest of the
individual. The use of a. different standard for these two separate
questions does not appear unworkable.
The differences between civil commitments and sterilization
determinations mayor may not be suffiCient to constitutionally
mandate use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, a standard·
traditionally reserved for criminal cases. The differences demon
strate that selecting which standard to apply requires an assess
ment of the underlying rights and social ·policies that a civil
criminal categorization does not provide. Unfortunately, the
uniform acceptance of the clear and convincing evidence standard
in nonconsensual sterilization proceedings has occurred without
this evaluation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Nonconsensual sterilization has far-reaching implications for
both society and the individual. Sterilization. of mentally retarded
individuals involves the value. placed upon the individual's rights
by society and the decisions and fears society has for its own evolu
tion. Absent legislative guidance, courts that have faced these com
plex issues must choose either to act. in a standardless environment
or to generate their own guidelines. Unless courts create standards
that recognize the full panoply of rights inherent in nonconsensual
sterilization determinations, there is a great likelihood that abuse of
an incompetent person's rights will occur.

160. . See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
161. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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The traditional role of the judiciary as the protector of individ
ual rights encompasses the responsibility to develop a decision
making framework that reflects an individual's right to procedural
and substantive due process. Comprehensive substantive standards
must exist that incorporate action congruent with the best interest
of the individual. An evaluation of both the individual and societal
concerns compels a rejection of any other basis for judicial inter
vention. The recognition of this basis for sterilization determina
tions by the Washington and New Jersey Supreme Courts may in
dicate a trend toward greater scrutiny of the mentally retarded
person's constitutional rights.
Courts must also evaluate what standard of proof is required
by due process in light of the fundamental interests involved.
While the Supreme Court in Addington squarely faced the issue of
what evidentiary standard is constitutionally mandated in cases of
civil commitments, that deCision, which found the clear and con
vincing standard sufficient, merely represents a starting point for
future analysis In other areas. An assessment of the underlying
rights and policies implicit in sterilization is necessary to avoid the
unjust results of a mechanical civil-criminal proof categorization.
The greatest danger that standardless ordering of sterilization
may have upon the mentally retarded is that their liberty may be
forsaken by those who profess paternalistic and benevolent
motives. The development of legal safeguards will protect the re
tarded either from being coerced or unknowingly subjected to an
unwarranted and irreversible sterilization procedure.
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